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COMMENTS
JUST SAY NO (TO AMERICAN CAPITALISM): WHY
AMERICAN INDIANS SHOULD REJECT THE MODEL
TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT AND OTHER
ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC ASSIMILATION
Aaron Drue Johnson*
1. Introduction
The economic plight of most American Indians is well documented and
widely known. Efforts undertaken by private citizens and the United States
government have done little to combat the cycle of poverty. Recently, the
National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform Commercial Laws
(NCCUSL) has proposed its own solution to the poverty conundrum: the
Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act (MTSTA).' The purpose of the Act
is to provide uniformity and lender security to afford financial capital to
privately owned businesses in Indian Country.2 Legislative measures similar
to the MTSTA have proven effective at promoting comparable loans in all fifty
states.3 Nevertheless, American Indian tribes must be aware that the negative
consequences of adopting the MTSTA will likely outweigh its practical
economic benefits.
The MTSTA is more than a simple legislative action. It is reflective of a
school of thought that emphasizes free markets and capitalism as the only
antidote to the ongoing economic crisis that plagues this country's first
inhabitants.' By adopting the MTSTA, a tribe would signal to its inhabitants
and to off-reservation businesspeople that it intends to amalgamate into the
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9-103 (2006).
2. See Susan Woodrow & Fred Miller, Lending in Indian Country: The Story Behind the
Model Secured Transaction Law, 15 BUs. L. TODAY 39, 39 (Nov/Dec. 2005).
3. Todd J. Janzen, Comment, Nationalize the Revised Article 9 Filing System: A
Comparison ofthe OldArticle 9 and Canadian Personal Property Filing Systems, 1 1 IND. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 389,389 & n.1 (2001) (noting that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
has been a "success" since it was completed in 1972 and adopted by all fifty states by 1988).
4. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE AND
COMMENTARY TO THE MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT 13 (2005) [hereinafter
MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE] (noting the need for
legislation of this type in private market economies).
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larger American economic system.' While most of the American intelligentsia
would deem such integration beneficial, or even necessary,' other avenues are
more promising and pose much less risk to the American Indian populace.
Solving the economic crisis the right way will require great amounts of unity
and fortitude, as Native Americans must develop and utilize political capital
to attain the benefits of an economically successful populace. There is no
doubt that the plight of the American Indians was caused and has been
perpetuated by European invaders.' They must shield themselves from
exploitation by the same group. In addition to being wholly inadequate to
combat the problem of poverty in Indian Country, the MTSTA effectively
fosters further exploitation.
Part II of this comment provides the necessary background information,
including examinations of the current economic status of most American
Indians, the historical factors that led to the current economic crisis, and the
development of the MTSTA itself. Part III explores the manner in which the
MTSTA fails to address the relevant social factors that make American Indians
more vulnerable to predatory lending at the hands of off-reservation creditors.
Part IV explains why the current economic model adopted by most tribes, with
its emphasis on centralized tribal ownership, is more conducive to widespread
growth than the system of private business ownership promoted by the Act.
Part V examines the advantages that tribally owned enterprises enjoy over
economies centered on private enterprise. Part VI briefly examines a few
political objectives that tribes should pursue to further development efforts.
This comment concludes in Part VII.
II. Background
A. Origins of the Economic Crisis
After they have shaken off their fear of us, they display a liberality
in their behavior which no one would believe without witnessing it.
5. Id. at 14 (noting that the MTSTA is intended to accommodate commercial activity
between tribal members and off-reservation businesses).
6. See Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or
Socialism Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 858 (2001) ("Tribes must do everything they can to
develop the entrepreneurial, capitalist spirit in reservation residents and ensure that more [tribal]
businesses are started ... in Indian country.").
7. See JON MANCHIP WHITE, EVERYDAY LIFE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 210-48
(2003); see also PAULRADIN, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 364 (1937) ("The Winning




No request of anything from them is ever refused, but they rather
invite acceptance of what they possess, and manifest such
generosity that they would give away their own hearts. Let the
article be of great or small value, they offer it readily, and receive
anything which is tendered in return with perfect content. ... Such
conduct cannot be ascribed to their want ofunderstanding, for they
are people of much ingenuity.'
-- Christopher Columbus
The America that Christopher Columbus "discovered" was not one filled
with savages. To the contrary, its inhabitants had learned to organize into
complex societies, cultivate crops, and live in peace and harmony.' American
Indians had their own religious beliefs, which allowed them to align
themselves with nature and coexist with minimal conflict.'o Attempts by
European missionaries to convert American Indians to Christianity were
usually unsuccessful, as "almost all Indians felt that Christianity offered them
very little compared to their own beliefs."" Contrary to the well-documented
brutality and forced imperialism that had occurred throughout Europe for
millennia, "there appear to have been very few instances of extensive warfare"
among Indians before the arrival of Europeans.12 Conflicts among American
Indians were usually settled by compromise, and there was enough land and
food for everyone."
The peaceful existence of the Native American tribes changed with the
arrival of Europeans. Despite that "most Indian tribes openly welcomed,
assisted, and traded" with the Europeans, the "Europeans maintained their
friendship with the Indians only when it served their interests.""4 As early
European invaders failed to uncover the riches that they had imagined, they
began to threaten and kill Indians." Many Indians were kidnapped and sold
as slaves in Europe." These early acts were merely the beginning of centuries
of exploitation and broken promises. In 1828, Andrew Jackson made removal
8. Letter from Christopher Columbus to Luis de Santangel (Feb. 1493), available at
http://cdlee.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/letter-of-columbus-to-luis-de-santangel.pdf
9. See generally KEITH L. PEARSON, THE INDIAN IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1-39 (1973).
10. Id. at 26.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 20.
13. Id. at 5, 20.
14. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 2 (3d ed. 2004).
15. PEARSON, supra note 9, at 21.
16. Id.
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policy - the removal of the eastern Indian tribes to the West - the "dominant
federal Indian policy of the nineteenth century."" In their treaties with the
federal government, "many eastern tribes were promised . . . new homes in
Arkansas, Kansas, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, or Wisconsin."' 8 Nearly all of
those treaties were broken."
Federal Indian policy took another turn in 1887 with the passage of the
General Allotment Act.20 The Act was designed "to extinguish tribal
sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the assimilation of Indians
into the society at large."21 The Act effectively freed land for non-Indian
settlement, as tribal members were granted separate parcels of land and
remaining tribal lands were sold to non-Indian farmers and ranchers.22
Attempts to assimilate Indians were "fiercely resisted," and efforts to do so
"failed miserably." 2 3
After a brief period of benevolence toward Indian tribes under Franklin
Roosevelt,24 the United States brought American Indians to the "brink of
disaster" during the termination era.25 Nineteen fifty-three marked the
beginning of a new policy of terminating the tribes' trust relationship with the
federal government, "and, as a consequence, [the tribes'] loss of federal
benefits and support services and the destruction of [the tribes'] government[s]
and reservation[s]." 26 A relocation program was created in 1956 to offer "job
training and housing assistance to Indians who would leave the reservation for
urban areas." 2 7 Nearly one-third of those who joined the program returned to
the reservations after the government's promises went unfulfilled.28
This historical background must not be disregarded. Before we preach the
capitalist gospel, we should remain mindful of two points. First, American
17. PEVAR, supra note 14, at 7.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 8-9.
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 10 ("Between 1934 and 1953, Indian landholdings increased by over two million
acres; federal funds were spent to improve reservation roads, homes, health facilities,
community schools, and irrigation systems; and tribal governments experienced a revitalization
after a century of oppression.").
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. ("In the decade that followed, Congress terminated its trust relationship with 109
tribes.").





Indians have a rich tradition that allowed them to prosper and coexist
peacefully for centuries prior to the European colonization.29 Second,
American Indians have repeatedly suffered abuse and exploitation at the hands
of Americans who claim to have their best interests in mind.30 Tribes should
be mindful of the possibility that the move toward capitalism promoted by the
Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act may be reminiscent of these past
abuses.
B. Current Economic Conditions in Indian Country
Today, reservation Indians are among the poorest people in the United
States." High rates of "poverty, unemployment, and substandard housing"
among Native Americans have caused observers to compare Indian
reservations to "third-world countries."32 The statistics support that
comparison. The unemployment rate among Indians is nearly forty-five
percent." Close to one-third of Indian households live below the poverty line,
and many Indians live without basic necessities "such as running water and
electricity."34 These dire conditions survive despite a surge in development
efforts on these lands in recent decades.
Contrary to popular belief, Indians cannot rely upon gaming to support their
economies and lift members of their ranks from poverty. As of 2005, only 224
of the more than 560 existing Indian tribes had gaming operations. In
addition, "the economic benefits of gaming are not [evenly] distributed
throughout Indian Country."3  This is unlikely to change, as "[m]ost
reservations, frequently the most impoverished, are too remote to attract many
customers, so incurring sizeable fixed costs for gaming operations would
actually reduce tribal welfare."3 8 There is also debate as to whether gaming is
29. Cf WHITE, supra note 7, at 114 ("Indian warfare was severely restricted in scope.").
30. Id. at 212 ("The Indian today refers to his 'Trail of Broken Treaties.').
31. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving Changes for
Economic Development, in MICHAEL W. CAMERON ET AL., WHAT CAN TRIBEs Do? 1, 3
(Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992).
32. Miller, supra note 6, at 758-59.
33. PEVAR, supra note 14, at 3.
34. Id
35. Miller, supra note 6, at 758.
36. Cezar M Froelich et al., Investing in Tribal Gaming, 9 GAMING L. REV. 19, 19 (2005).
37. Gavin Clarkson, AccreditedIndians: Increasing the Flow ofPrivate Equity into Indian
Country as a Domestic Emerging Market, 80 U. COLO. L. REv. 285, 286-87 (2009) [hereinafter
Clarkson, Accredited Indians].
38. David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from Itself?
Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment, 8 J. SMALL& EMERGING Bus. L. 173, 187-
No. 1] 111
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"truly advantageous" to those tribes who engage in it, as tribes must "subject[]
themselves to increased federal and state regulation" to conduct gaming
activity.39 Tribes must therefore pursue alternative and innovative industry if
sustainable economic growth is to be achieved.
C. Scope of the Issue
American Indian tribal entities present unique challenges in development
economics for several reasons. First, Native Americans have a distinctive
history. Centuries of exploitation and coerced displacement have uprooted and
eliminated some cultural idiosyncrasies.4 0 Tribes have thus been forced to
adapt to changing and unpredictable circumstances while attempting to
maintain self-identity. That balancing act continues in full force among most
American Indians to this day, and any attempt to significantly alter the
economic and political structure of Indian tribes must take such factors into
consideration. Furthermore, the tumultuous history of American Indians has
fostered a deep skepticism toward the federal government.4 1 Where the typical
third-world country would clamor for an opportunity to be integrated within
the Western global economy, American Indians display an understandable
resistance toward assimilation and integration.42 Second, the cyclical erosion
and restoration of tribal sovereignty has led to an uncertainty among tribal
governments that is atypical in the average developing nation.4 3 Finally, tribes
have been incentivized to employ economic structures favoring centralized
business ownership and implementation.' This also flies in the face of
traditional development economics. International entities such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund are notoriously insistent upon open
markets, free trade, and private ownership.4 5
88 (2004).
39. Alan E. Brown, Ace in the Hole: Land's Key Role in Indian Gaming, 39 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 159, 160 (2005).
40. THE INDIAN IN AMERICA'S PAST 78 (Jack D. Forbes ed., 1964) (noting "the visible
cultural[] and moral degeneration" accompanying the European conquest ofNative Americans).
41. PEVAR, supra note 14, at 13 (noting that tribes have caused "backlash" in recent
decades as they have "increasingly asserted their treaty and statutory rights").
42. See id.
43. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic Republican Vision ofDomestic Dependent Nations in
the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-
empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 511-12.
44. Miller, supra note 6, at 762.
45. See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 140 (2003) (objecting to current policy-based conditions attached to




Among the most daunting of issues facing tribal economic development is
the reality that tribes and individuals "lack access to financial capital."'
Tribes "cite lack of capital as one of the five main obstacles they face to
economic development. 47 It is simply impossible to implement profitable
business endeavors without adequate financing.
American Indians generally lack access to the primary methods that
businesspeople use to finance new enterprise - "family money, home equity,
and the usual credit channels.' 8 Access to family money, of course, cannot
be increased without overall economic improvement. Obtaining home equity
is typically even more difficult because the federal government owns fee title
to Indian trust land with the tribes retaining a right of occupancy,4 9 and
because Indian trust land is consequently subject to transfer restrictions
imposed by Acts of Congress, Indian treaties, and proclamations from the
Secretary of the Interior.50 American Indians who cannot obtain financial
capital from public sources such as the federal government therefore must
usually rely upon the third method - normal credit channels. Doing so has
proved difficult, as perceived instability in tribal governments and policies
prevent outside lenders from making investments in Indian Country." Access
to capital "is first and foremost a problem of political development" 52 and is
"hampered in Indian Country by the lack of standard laws governing business
and lending transactions.""
D. The Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act-A Primer
The aim of the MTSTA is to govern the law of secured transactions among
Indian tribes that have adopted the Act.5 4  A secured transaction is a
transaction that is founded on a security agreement and gives rise to a security
Bank) [hereinafter CHANG, KICKING].
46. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 31, at 6.
47. Joanna M. Wagner, Comment, Improving Native American Access to Federal Funding
for Economic Development Through Partnerships with Rural Communities, 32 AM. INDIIAN L.
REV. 525, 527 (2007-2008).
48. Id. at 542.
49. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 562 (1823).
50. John McGee Ingram, Home Ownership Opportunities in Indian Country, 7 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 164, 165 (1998).
51. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 31, at 11.
52. Id.
53. Tim Berg, Growing Indian Economies, ARIZ. ATT'Y, Mar. 2006, at 30, 32.
54. MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 4,
at 11.
113No. 1]
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interest." A security interest is a property interest created to secure
performance of an obligation.56 A mortgage agreement, for example, is a
secured transaction." In a mortgage situation, a creditor forwards money to
a debtor in return for the debtor's promise to repay the loan." As a condition
for the loan, the creditor takes an interest in the debtor's real property that may
become possessory if the debtor fails to repay the loan." The creditor is
"secured" by the debtor's property.o
The MTSTA governs transactions that are similar to the mortgage situation
in most respects, except the nature of the collateral. The MTSTA is similar to
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in that it governs secured
transactions concerning security interests in personal property rather than
realty." Creditors prefer to be secured creditors for two main reasons. First,
secured transactions provide strong incentives to debtors to pay their debts. 2
When a restaurant owner stands to lose vital equipment upon failure to repay
a loan, her entire livelihood may be at stake. She will certainly have strong
incentives to make that loan a priority as she pays her debts. Second, in the
event that the debtor defaults, the creditor will be in a better position to recover
all or part of the debt owed to it." If our hypothetical restaurant owner failed
to pay the debt owed to a bank, the bank would thus be able to foreclose on her
equipment and use the proceeds from sale to recover what is owed.'
Outside banks have proven reluctant to lend money to individuals and
entities in Indian Country largely because of fears that their interests will not
be enforced by tribal governments and courts. Furthermore, the variances in
law and policy among the more than 560 American tribes are seen as a burden
55. Id. at 13.
56. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1478 (9th ed. 2009).
57. LYNN M. LoPucKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
21 (6th ed. 2009).
58. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE
TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 99-100 (7th ed. 2006).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 100.
61. See Edwin E. Smith & Bingham McCutchen, What Lawyers Need to Know About UCC
Article 9: Secured Transactions 2008, 903 PLI/COMM 101 (2008).
62. LOPuCKI & WARREN, supra note 57, at 22.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, COMMERCIAL LENDING IN INDIAN COUNTRY: POTENTIAL




to lenders who otherwise can adhere largely to a single body of law in all fifty
states.
The NCCUSL promulgated the MTSTA in 2005 to address the issue of
uniformity and lender security.67 NCCUSL is also the organization
responsible for drafting the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9 of which
governs secured transactions, in whole or significant part, in all fifty states.
The NCCUSL took steps to ensure that the MTSTA was sensitive to the
cultural and economic customs of the Indian tribes.69 The Act was drafted in
liaison with Native American tribes to ensure that such factors were taken into
account.70 Despite attempts to ensure that the MTSTA is sensitive to the
cultural and ethnic considerations of American Indians, it simply does not
offer adequate protection to those who are unfamiliar with the Darwinian
nature of the American capitalist system.
III. The Problem ofPredatory Lending"
Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations,72 released in 1776, earned its Scottish author the title "the father of
modern economic theory."73 Perhaps the most influential theme of the book
is that of the "invisible hand" - the concept that the aggregate of all
individuals, guided by self-interest in a society, will have the cumulative effect
of creating wealth in the overall society.74
66. See generally Bruce A. King, The Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act and Tribal
Economic Development, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 804 (2007).
67. See Woodrow & Miller, supra note 2, at 39.
68. See King, supra note 66, at 808.
69. MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 4,
at 19.
70. King, supra note 66, at 804.
71. Much controversy exists as to the precise definition of the term "predatory lending."
For our purposes, predatory lending has two essential characteristics: "(1) a wide range of
lender behavior that is either substantively or procedurally unreasonably abusive, exploitive,
harmful, or unfair; (2) a pool of borrowers that are particularity vulnerable targeted and
exploited precisely because of their vulnerability." Cecil J. Hunt II, In the Racial Crosshairs:
Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate
Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 211, 222 (2003).
72. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(Edwin Cannan ed., 1904) (1776).
73. John Mixon, Neoclassical Economics and the Erosion of Middle-Class Values: An
Explanation for Economic Collapse, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 327, 333
(2010).
74. Jeanne M. Dennis, The Lessons of Comparable Worth: A Feminist Vision ofLaw and
No. 1] 115
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The United States has implemented much of Smith's theory with obvious
success. An illustrative application of Smith's invisible-hand theory to the
current discussion would appear as follows: Off-reservation lenders seeking
to attain wealth will make loans in Indian Country that they deem worth the
risk so that they may profit by collecting interest. Similarly, Indians, also
seeking wealth, will accept those loans if they consider the terms of the loans
offered by off-reservation lenders to be satisfactory. In an ideal scenario, each
party will correctly make the decisions that are most individually favorable,
and each party, in turn, will benefit. Rarely is reality so seamless. In the real
world, the party with the greatest bargaining power will tend to receive more
favorable treatment under the agreement." While the typical off-reservation
bank will have no trouble surviving without issuing high-risk loans in Indian
Country, the struggling American Indian will likely find any loan - even those
that make him extremely vulnerable - to be attractive.
Lenders are known to target America's poorest people." It is therefore
unsurprising that Native Americans are disproportionately affected by
predatory lending, according to a recent study carried out by the Center for
Responsible Lending." Actualizing the MTSTA's stated objective of
facilitating private investment could open a Pandora's box of unfair business
dealing and manipulation, doing more harm than good to consumers and
aspiring business owners. For several reasons, including a lack of experience
with the American financial system, language issues, and the increased risk
caused by legal uncertainty in Indian Country, American Indians may be even
more vulnerable than other minority groups in similar economic circumstances
to the harmful lending practices of financial institutions. The MTSTA does
not do enough to combat this threat, and unfortunately, strong efforts to amend
the Act would ultimately eliminate its effectiveness.
A. Factors Rendering Native Americans Vulnerable to Predatory Lending
1. Lack ofFinancial Literacy
Financial illiteracy in the face of today's exotic lending market has proven
Economic Theory, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 16 (1993).
75. See JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING
AND NEGOTIATION 215-16 (1975).
76. Megan S. Knize, Payday in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas: Toward Effective
Protections for Borrowers, 69 LA. L. REv. 317, 323 (2009).
77. Michael E. Roberts, Limit Financial Setbacks with Consumer Protection, INDIAN




to be a pervasive issue that affects more than the country's poor." Even
among highly educated people, a good proportion are not financially literate.79
Lack of financial literacy could be a critical issue in Indian Country for at least
three reasons. The first issue concerns the performance of the educational
systems in Indian Country. Tribal school student performance remains
significantly lower than that of public school students, and drop-outs are
disproportionately high.so In addition, "half [of] the adult Indian population
lacks a high school diploma."81
The second problem is linguistic in nature. "As recently as 1994,
approximately one-third of all students in BIA and tribal schools spoke a
language other than English in their home, and . .. about twenty-eight percent
had limited English proficiency." 82 Without a strong grounding in the English
language, it is unlikely that a borrower could understand the complex legalese
often present in security agreements.
Finally, American Indians' lack of experience in dealing with off-
reservation banks could prove problematic. While many Americans acquire
extensive experience with the financial system as they secure mortgage loans
to buy a home, Native Americans rarely gain such experience. In fact, "even
middle and upper income Indians on reservations are confronted by inadequate
housing, a situation aggravated by a lack of access to home mortgages."84
Another factor that leads to limited experience with commercial lenders is the
nature of most tribal economies, which tend to feature relatively little private
enterprise." While tribal governments are experienced in matters regarding
78. Clues for the Clueless, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 05, 2008), http://www.newsweek.com/id/
130590.
79. Id.
80. Jonathan M. Lindeen, Comment, BIA Tribal Schools and the No ChildLeft BehindAct:
An Argument for a More Culturally Sensitive Implementation, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 361,
364-69 (2005).
81. PEVAR, supra note 14, at 3.
82. Lindeen, supra note 80, at 368.
83. See Ingram, supra note 50, at 164-67 (noting that numerous factors, including the
inalienability of trust land, the absence of market data available to lenders, and the limited
enforceability of contracts requiring the tribe to be a party severely hamper the possibility of
widespread home ownership in Indian Country).
84. Yair Listokin, Confronting the Barriers to NativeAmerican Home Ownership on Tribal
Lands: The Case of the Navajo Partnership Housing, 33 URB. LAw. 433, 433 (2001).
85. See Miller, supra note 6, at 758-59.
No. 1]1 117
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
business and development," the typical reservation inhabitant simply does not
have that experience.
2. Risk
A very thin line separates unfair predatory lending and equitable, mutually
beneficial subprime lending." Virtually all lenders scrutinize the ability of
potential borrowers to repay a loan by examining, inter alia, their income,
assets, and credit history." Borrowers who are deemed to pose higher risks are
charged higher rates than those who seem to pose little risk of non-
repayment.90 Trouble arises when lenders charge excessive rates to desperate
borrowers under the guise of fair subprime lending. Even if tribes implement
the MTSTA, lenders will still claim that loans granted in Indian Country are
excessively risky.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been in place in all fifty
states for decades. 91 Lenders can simply look to a state's case law to determine
how issues arising under the statute will be handled. Conversely, lenders in
the immediate future will be unable to look to tribal courts, which are not
bound by the precedent of any state.92 Furthermore, attempts by lenders to
insert contractual provisions designed to minimize jurisdictional quarrels may
be ineffective. For example, a contractual provision granting an off-
reservation lender a right to self-help repossession of property located on
reservation land could be deemed unenforceable if the provision conflicts with
tribal law. Such was the case in Babbitt Ford v. Navajo Indian Tribe.93 This
legal uncertainty, coupled with the high poverty rates of American Indians and
the potential difficulty of repossessing collateral on reservation lands, would
do much to support a lender's assertion that loans to tribal debtors warrant
86. Miller, supra note 6, at 760 ("Today, Indian tribes organize, fund, and, in many
instances, operate or direct day to day affairs of many of the businesses and the majority of
economic activity in Indian country.").
87. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 31, at 6-7 (noting that "[e]ntrepreneurial skills and
experience are scarce" in Indian Country).
88. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., CURBING
PREDATORY HOME AND MORTGAGE LENDING 2, 27 (2000) [hereinafter HUD REPORT].
89. Id.
90. Deborah Goldstein, Comment, Protecting Consumers from Predatory Lenders:
Defining the Problem and Moving Toward Workable Solutions, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
225, 229 (2000).
91. See King, supra note 66, at 808.
92. Gabriel S. Galanda, Reservations of Right: A Practitioner's Guide to Indian Law,
BRIEF, Fall 2002, at 64, 65, available at Westlaw, 32-FALL BRIEF 64.




high rates of interest. It is almost inevitable that many loans, examined either
ex ante or ex post, would be deemed unfair or even predatory.
3. Race
We must not deny reality. Native Americans will likely be targeted with
unfair lending practices because of their race. The subprime predatory lending
problem is disproportionately concentrated in minority communities.9 4
Statistics indicate that the gap in subprime lending practices cannot be
explained by disparities in income alone." A HUD/Treasury study determined
that the disproportionate concentration of predatory lending in minority groups
existed not only in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, but in high-
income neighborhoods as well.96 The study's findings are startling. For
example, the study found that "borrowers . . . in upper-income black
neighborhoods [are] twice as likely as homeowners in low-income white
neighborhoods to refinance with a subprime loan."97
HUD gives several reasons for the discrepancy. The HUD report asserts
that "the disproportionate amount of subprime lending in certain
neighborhoods likely results from the following factors: differences in credit
characteristics of borrowers; differences in the types of loans (e.g. small
balance loans); and less competition from mainstream lenders." 98 Moreover,
it asserts that "[1]ow-income and minority neighborhoods may be especially
vulnerable to abusive lending practices because subprime lending tends to be
concentrated in these neighborhoods."99
Notwithstanding HUD's conclusions, American Indians are free to make
their own inferences in response to these statistics. My feeling, however, is
that Native American tribes that adopt the MTSTA are inviting the same type
of harnful lending practices documented in the HUD study. The MTSTA
simply does not provide adequate protection against racially disproportionate
predatory-lending practices.
94. Hunt II, supra note 71, at 235.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 235-36.
98. HUD REPORT, supra note 88, at 47.
99. Id.
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B. Shortcomings of the MTSTA
There is no doubt that entering into business is inherently risky. Attempts
to eliminate that risk are generally futile and often harmful.'oo The MTSTA,
however, barely accounts for the excessive risks posed to potential tribal
debtors entering into agreements with off-reservation lenders. The Act fails
most significantly in three areas: (1) it maintains the same
consumer/commercial distinctions as Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code without offering enhanced protection for tribal commercial debtors, (2)
it places no additional limits on what can serve as collateral to secure a loan,
and (3) it places no limitations on a debtor's ability to declare default under an
"insecurity clause," leaving the flimsy "fair dealing" duty as a debtor's only
protection."o' Each of these issues will be examined in turn.
1. Consumer/Commercial Debtor Distinction
The Uniform Commercial Code includes several specific protections for
consumer debtors, as opposed to commercial ones.'02 The rationale behind
these provisions is that consumers are generally less knowledgeable of
commercial business practices and are therefore more susceptible to
exploitation. 0 3 The same rationale may be applied to commercial debtors on
many Indian reservations. Many tribes have not opened their markets to
facilitate widespread private enterprise among members.'" New business
owners thus may be as vulnerable to exploitation by experienced investors as
consumer borrowers. It is therefore critical to include provisions that ensure
borrowers will be informed of their rights and duties with respect to secured
credit. Fortunately, much can be done in this regard without substantially
burdening the rights of creditors.
If such protections are not implemented to protect tribal commercial
debtors, then it is imperative that tribal governments find some way to ensure
that budding business owners have access to adequate legal counsel and/or
business education. Off-reservation creditors are likely to target inexperienced
100. See Dennis, supra note 74, at 16 (noting the assertion of neoclassical economists that
"government involvement in market transactions" are "unnecessary and disruptive").
101. MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9-113 (2006).
102. See Smith & McCutchen, supra note 61, at 153.
103. See Jean Braucher, Deadlock: Consumer Transactions UnderRevisedArticle 9,73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 83, 93-94 (1999).
104. See Miller, supra note 6, at 759-60.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol35/iss1/10
tribal businesspeople.'0o The frequent distinctions between consumer and
commercial debtors make those business owners substantially more vulnerable
to abuse.'o
2. No Limitations on What Can Serve as Collateral
The lack of home ownership in Indian Country has a substantial impact on
overall tribal economies. Nearly a third of all home-equity lines of credit in
the United States are taken out for business purposes.' 7 Far too few Indians
own homes to support sustainable business growth and necessary access to
affordable capital sources.' Complex legal issues, including the inalienability
of Indian trust land by tribes and their members absent government consent,
have rendered individual home ownership in Indian Country almost
nonexistent.10 Because of such barriers, "home ownership rates for []
moderate- and higher-income Native Americans are still well below home
ownership rates for non-Indians at the same income level.""o
The nature of ownership in Indian Country demands that most American
Indians find sources other than their homes to serve as collateral for off-
reservation loans."' Limits on what may serve as collateral are non-existent
in the Act. States typically deal with this issue by passing "exemption
statutes," which protect debtors by sheltering specified property from forced
105. See Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L.
REV. 725, 735 (2005).
106. There are several instances in the MTSTA in which consumer debtors receive added
protection. First, creditors must provide a more specific description of collateral in a consumer
transaction than in a commercial one. MODELTRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9-116(c)
(2006). Second, there are limitations set on the effectiveness of an after-acquired property
clause in consumer transaction. Id. § 9-203(b). Third, twenty days notice is required for
disposition of collateral in consumer transactions, with only ten required in case of commercial
debtors. Id. § 9-612(b). Fourth, creditors are required to offer a detailed explanation of the
calculation of surplus or deficiency after disposition in consumer transactions. Id. § 9-616.
Fifth, creditors may not retain collateral in partial satisfaction of an obligation in consumer
transactions. Id. § 9-620(a). Sixth, disposition of collateral is mandatory if sixty percent of the
principal amount has been paid by a consumer debtor. Id. § 9-620(e).
107. Craig Nolte, Sovereign Lending: Bringing Housing to Indian Country, COMMUNITY
INVESTMENTS, May 2000, at 15, available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/
investments/cra00- 1/MayCINewsMayOO.pdf.
108. Id.
109. See Ingram, supra note 50, at 164-66.
110. Id. at 168.
111. See Clarkson, Accredited Indians, supra note 37, at 298 ("[A]s of 1999, there were only
471 home mortgages throughout Indian Country.").
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sale.1 2 Any tribe that elects to pass the MTSTA as proposed must be sure that
it contains an exemption provision providing adequate protection to tribal
debtors.
One Navajo Nation tribal court judge noted that granting security interests
in collateral essential to one's survival renders debtors exceptionally
vulnerable to the whims of creditors."' Commenting on the negative nature
of the self-help-repossession remedy, the Navajo Tribal Court has labeled the
doctrine of self-help "an archaic legal provision" that has permitted
businesspeople to "ride rough shod over consumers" by "holding [] essential
property needed for daily life as a means of extorting money from the
consumer."' 14
Given the lack of home ownership in Indian Country, it is difficult to
imagine the items of value that desperately poor Indians would pledge as
collateral. Without protection, American Indians would certainly be
vulnerable to the type of extortionate practices railed against by the Navajo
Nation court.
3. Exploitation Through Default Provisions
A secured party may carry out the remedies made available in the MTSTA
only after default on the part of the debtor."' The prospect of debtor abuse
arises when "default" is not clearly defined."' Generally, "default" is defined
as "the debtor's failure to pay a debt when due or otherwise perform the
agreement between the debtor and creditor.""' The precise terms of default
are stipulated in the security agreement between the parties, and agreements
generally contain broad definitions of default that favor the creditor."8 Most
agreements include an insecurity clause, which generally states that a debtor
is in default "[w]henever [the] Secured Party in good faith believes the
prospect of payment or performance is impaired or in good faith believes the
collateral is insecure."" 9 Such an expansive provision gives a creditor almost
unlimited authority to call a loan at his option. Debtors, however, are
protected under the MTSTA by a provision requiring parties to "be honest and
112. 31 AM. JUR. 2D Exemptions § 3 (2010).
113. Russell v. Donaldson, 3 Navajo Rptr. 209, 213 (Navajo 1982).
114. Id.
115. MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9-601(a) (2006).
116. Cf LoPuCKi & WARREN, supra note 57, at 217.
117. Id.
118. Id.




act in a manner that is consistent with reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing." 20 The question of what constitutes "good faith" in calling a loan is
therefore not left entirely to the discretion of the creditor. A tribal court would
have the authority under the MTSTA to impose its own definition of good
faith and fair dealing if the issue were to arise. The lack of concrete
limitations on when creditors may call a loan could, however, be problematic.
Reliance upon the good-faith provision gives tribal courts a great deal of
discretion, but distrust of tribal courts among off-reservation creditors could
increase the risk profile of loans in Indian Country. Such an increase in risk
would undoubtedly be accompanied by increases in interest rates.121
Tribes that adopt the MTSTA could provide additional protection to debtors
by adding statutory provisions requiring creditors to notify debtors of their
intent to accelerate, which would grant the debtor a chance to cure and
reinstate.122 Some courts have imposed the requirement judicially. The Ninth
Circuit, for example, has stated that "[b]oth state and federal courts have made
clear the unquestionable principle that, even when the terms of a note do not
require notice or demand as a prerequisite to accelerating a note, the holder
must take affirmative action to notify the debtor that it intends to
accelerate." 23
Regardless of which solution adopting tribes choose, off-reservation
creditors cannot be granted excessive leeway in declaring default and
accelerating loans against tribal debtors. The balance of power in these
transactions already favors off-reservation creditors.124 The ability to evoke
an agreement's insecurity clause to call a loan would grant creditors
extraordinary leverage and harmful influence.
120. MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9-113.
121. MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 4,
at 13.
122. "Accelerate" refers to a creditor's ability to declare all payments owed by a debtor
immediately due and payable. LOPUCKI& WARREN, supra note 57, at 221-22. "[A] debtor has
the right to 'cure' a default by paying the amount then due" if the debtor does so before the
creditor elects to accelerate. Id. at 226. Once the debtor has cured the default, the original
payment schedule is "reinstated." Id. at 227.
123. In re Crystal Props., Ltd., 268 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis removed).
124. LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 57, at 226 ("The typical agreement permits the
creditor to accelerate for any default, however small.").
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C. Why Correcting the Act Is Impractical: The Necessity of the Self-Help
Remedy
Identifying the flaws in the MTSTA is easy. Yet, because of the nature of
the Act and the business of lending, correcting these flaws is virtually
impossible. Creditors will be unwilling to invest in Indian Country if their
rights are not protected, and the MTSTA already includes an enormous
concession that could deter creditors: the absence of a self-help-repossession
remedy.'25 An in-depth discussion of this omission is warranted for two
reasons. First, the decision is easily the MTSTA's most noteworthy departure
from Article 9. Virtually no discussion of the Act would be complete without
addressing its absence. Second, the absence of a self-help-repossession
remedy illustrates how difficult it is to shift the balance of power legislatively
by offering enhanced debtor protection. Each action taken to protect debtors
reduces the efficacy of the Act.
Section 9-609 of the MTSTA limits the manner in which secured creditors
can take possession of property after default by a debtor.'26 The creditor may
take possession unless otherwise agreed by the parties, but the secured party
may do so only after obtaining consent of the debtor or acquiring the right
through the judicial process.'27 This provision differs from Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which allows a secured party to repossess
collateral without appealing to the judicial process.'28 In a legislative note, the
NCCUSL observes the economic efficiencies of allowing self-help
repossession and implicitly suggests that adopting tribes consider a provision
modeled after the Uniform Commercial Code.129
The Committee's stated reason for requiring debtor consent or judicial
authorization as a prerequisite for repossession of collateral is "that issues
involving repossession are typically reserved to Tribal courts."o30 It is more
likely, however, that the Committee simply did not want to deter tribes from
adopting the MTSTA by including one of the most controversial elements of
Article 9. Even in general American society, where the cultural divisions are
not nearly as pronounced as those involving transactions between reservation
125. See generally MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT.
126. Id. §9-609.
127. Id.
128. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-609 (2000).
129. MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 4,
at 83.
130. Id
124 [Vol. 3 5
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borrowers and off-reservation lenders, the self-help remedy of Article 9 has
caused a great deal of friction and litigation."' The Code stipulates that
secured parties may use the remedy only if they can do so without breaching
the peace. 13 2  The contention surrounds the repossession service's legal
boundaries in seizing collateral without breaching the statutory duty."'
It is obvious why this provision would generate great scrutiny among Indian
tribes. One can only imagine the potential for commotion as outside lenders
encroach upon reservation property to seize goods in the possession of its
inhabitants. In addition to provoking resistance from tribal citizens, issues
such as this can easily be mired in legal complexities involving tribal
sovereignty.134 Long before the MTSTA was promulgated, tribal courts
expressed disdain for the self-help provision."' There is a logical fear that
outside lenders, often unsympathetic to the cultural sensitivities of tribal
people, will use the leverage acquired through a security interest to abuse
debtors."' Any community looking to adopt the MTSTA must address the
issue, as a failure to do so could result in a rejection of the Act by tribal
members.
Despite the complications introduced by inclusion of the self-help remedy,
the availability of self-help repossession is crucial to creditors, and a piece of
legislation that does not afford the remedy may not satisfactorily achieve its
end. The remedy is not novel, as "[e]ven before the [Uniform Commercial
Code], [] creditor[s] w[ere] allowed to repossess [] chattel[s] using self-help
methods.""' For several reasons, the remedy is popular and pervasive despite
its obvious faults. Litigation and law enforcement can be expensive and
131. See Eugene J. Kelly, Jr. et al., Secured Party Liability for the Acts of Repossessors:
Exposure, Protective Steps, and Ethical Responsibility, 55 CONSUMERFIN. L.Q. REP. 158, 159-
61(2001).
132. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-609.
133. Kelly, Jr. et al., supra note 131, at 160-61.
134. See Steven W. Bugg, The Business Ramifications of Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Life
After Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 53 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 59, 61 (1999) (noting that states will not aid lenders in obtaining pledged property in
Indian Country, and that tribal legal systems comprise the sole remedy).
135. See Russell v. Donaldson, 3 Navajo Rptr. 209, 213 (Navajo 1982).
136. See id. ("[Self-help repossession] permits sellers to ride rough shod over consumers and
use the holding of essential property needed for daily life as a means of extorting money from
the consumer.").
137. Stephen M. Cozart, Note, Through the Eyes ofthe Debtor: Mississippi Reexamines the
Breach ofthe Peace Exception to Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-503, 15 Miss. C.L. REV.
145, 147 (1992).
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inconvenient.' In American courts, creditors "must obtain a court order for
possession" before enlisting the sheriff to levy on the property at issue, and
"[t]he easiest way to obtain such an order is by filing an action for replevin."'39
The creditor can usually get a hearing within ten to twenty days, but the party
must usually post a bond to protect the debtor in the event that the debtor
ultimately prevails in the action.140 Alternatively, exercising the right to self-
help repossession typically saves time and money.'4 ' Furthermore, debtors
who will soon be dispossessed of a piece of property "may have little incentive
to preserve and maintain the property."' 42 Once alerted of an impending
repossession, debtors may even actively seek to diminish the value of the
collateral.'43 Self-help repossession therefore aids in protecting the property
at issue.
That the omission of a single provision could potentially jeopardize the
effectiveness of the entire Act is illustrative of a greater dilemma. Exploitation
of tribal debtors by off-reservation lenders should be expected if legislation is
passed to facilitate off-reservation lending. Attempts to minimize such
predatory practices, however, could render the MTSTA useless. Unless the
benefits of the legislation outweigh the risks, it should be rejected.
IV. Exploring the Act's Potential for Actual Effectiveness
There is truth to the adage, "Beggars cannot be choosers." But that adage
is not applicable here. Admittedly, the potential evils regarding predatory
lending seem minor in comparison to the dire economic circumstances facing
the vast majority of reservation Indians. If the MTSTA - along with the
accompanied shift toward private business ownership - could serve as a viable
tool in facilitating real economic development, no one would allow the
potential for exploitation to stand in its way. Regrettably, the Act is unlikely
to abet development efforts. While the current economic models of most
tribes have clearly been ineffective,'" those models should not be abandoned.
138. LoPUCKI & WARREN, supra note at 57, at 43.
139. Id. at 39.
140. Id. at 39-40.
141. Id. at 43.
142. Id. at 38.
143. Id. at 38-39. The MTSTA does not empower the creditor to employ judicial means to
retain collateral, which means that the debtor would be aware of the pending repossession.
MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9-601 (2006).
144. Miller, supra note 6, at 798 (noting that the majority of Native American




Instead, tribes should seek to improve the efficiency of the current models
while making only gradual, controlled movement toward economic
assimilation.
The MTSTA is designed to promote loans to private individuals who seek
to start and operate private businesses.'45 Governments who seek to obtain
financial capital do not do so through the type of private loans govemed by the
MTSTA.146 The adoption and success of the Act thus is contingent on the
ability of private individuals to start businesses in the first place. American
Indians rank "last in the United States in the number of privately owned
businesses and business income per capita."I 47  A large percentage of
commercial enterprise in tribal areas is owned, run, and operated by tribal
governments.'48 The current economic systems of Indian tribes resulted
largely from past federal Indian policy in which the federal government
operated and funded much commercial activity in Indian Country.149 As a
consequence of these policies, the economic systems of most tribal
governments resemble socialist economies." 0
Tax incentives provided by the federal government also encourage tribes to
adopt socialist structures. Specifically, "[t]ribes are exempt from state and
federal income taxes, empowered to levy their own taxes and devise their own
business codes, and often exempt from federal and/or state economic
regulation.""' There is no doubt that the socialist structure of most tribal
economies presents problems. Most scholars argue that such schemes are
unsatisfactory and will not lead to sustained development. One such scholar
asserts that "the number one problem for tribal enterprises is separating politics
from day-to-day business affairs."' 52 Another shortcoming of this type of
system is that managers may not be adequately motivated to work toward the
firm's profit maximization.' 3 In private firms, shareholders ensure that
145. MODELTRIBALSECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 4,
at 13.
146. See Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bonds: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory Restraints on
Tribal Economic Development, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1009, 1030-31 (2009) (hereinafter Clarkson,
Tribal Bonds] (explaining the nature of municipal debt).
147. Miller, supra note 6, at 827.
148. Id. at 760.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 760-61.
151. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 31, at 36.
152. Id. at 37.
153. Id. at 31.
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performance by managers is adequately compensated and rewarded.'
Conversely, "[i]t generally has not been politically acceptable for government
officials to gain significantly off the operations of businesses that are . . .
publicly owned."'15
Attempts to ensure that management in state-owned operations will have
adequate incentives by linking pay to performance are generally ineffective.
As economist Ha-Joon Chang explains, the difficulty results from phenomenon
known as the "principal-agent problem," which is caused by the "fundamental
gap in information" that exists between the citizenry (principals) and hired
managers (agents). 6 Essentially, "the principal will find it very difficult to
prove that" the business's "poor performance" was caused by the agent's
deficient management.'"
Another factor contributing to the inefficiency of state-run enterprises is the
"free-rider" problem. This term refers to "[t]he problem [] that any increase
in profit resulting from the extra monitoring of the [state-owned enterprise]
managers by some citizens will be shared by every citizen, while only those
citizens who do the monitoring pay the costs.""' The effect is that the effort
expended by the monitoring citizens will not reap adequate returns for those
individuals. Everyone will elect to "free-ride," and no one will take the
necessary action to detect and eliminate poor managerial performance.
These problems are mitigated among Indian tribes because the effective
stockholders in Indian tribes (the voting-age members of the tribe) are
relatively few in number and have personal access to agents.' These tribal
members can pressure agents to serve their interests.
While the state-owned enterprise has its downsides, the private-sector firm
is vulnerable to the very same issues.6 0 In the future, it will likely be wise for
tribes to make some movement toward private ownership; however, wholesale
abandonment of current tribal economic principles is unnecessary. Such a
154. Id. at 37.
155. Id.
156. HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET
HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 105 (2008) [hereinafter CHANG, SAMARITANS].
157. Id.
158. Id. at 105-06.
159. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 31, at 37.
160. CHANG, SAMARITANS, supra note 156, at 107 (noting that in situations in which "a
private enterprise is run by hired managers and there are numerous shareholders owning only
small factions of the company,. . . [t]he hired managers . .. will [] have no incentive to put in
more than sub-optimal levels of effort. . . , while individual shareholders will not have enough




shift would be impractical because tribal governments would be unable to raise
adequate revenue by taxing tribal members."' Most importantly, a drastic
shift toward the American capitalist structure will likely be wholly ineffective
in sparking tribal economies because many tribes will have trouble obtaining
adequate revenue to perform standard government functions, and private
entrepreneurship is unlikely to spark the type of economic growth needed to
promote wholesale employment.
A. The Need for Tribal Revenue
The dire economic condition of most American Indian tribes also plays a
role in the development and maintenance of pseudo-socialist economic
systems. Because such a large percentage of Indian Country inhabitants live
in extreme poverty, it is impractical for tribal governments to raise revenues
by taxing those members.'6 2 To provide basic goods and services for its
members, tribes must therefore raise revenue through alternative methods.
Operating businesses and reaping profits is a practical way to achieve this end.
High rates of poverty and the attendant failure of social institutions in
Indian Country necessitate social welfare institutions.163 Such institutions,
including those designed to promote health and education, are necessary for
economic development.'" To this point, Chang asserts,
Cost-effective public provision of health and education can bring
about improvements in labour [sic] force quality that can, in turn,
raise efficiency and accelerate productivity growth. Social welfare
institutions reduce social tensions and enhance the legitimacy of the
political system, thus providing a more stable environment for
long-term investments. Inter-temporal smoothing of consumption
through devices like unemployment benefit can even contribute to
dampening the business cycle. And so on.'
Social welfare institutions are costly.' "State and local governments
obtain revenues to finance their operations primarily through three channels:
161. Miller, supra note 6, at 833 ("Few tribes have access to substantial sources of taxation
because of a lack of economic activity.").
162. Id.
163. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 31, at 3 ("Indian reservations continue to experience ...
high dependency on welfare.").
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tax revenues, borrowing, and federal grants.""' Absent substantial increases
in federal monies, tribes that move away from the tribally-run-enterprise
system must rely on taxation and borrowing. Borrowing, however, is probably
not a viable option for most tribal governments. While some tribal
governments have the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds - debt securities "in
which the interest portion of the debt service paid is not included in gross
income"' - the borrowed proceeds must be used in the exercise of essential
governmental functions," and those tribes must nonetheless compete with
other government entities for those funds.' While "[b]orrowing has
increasingly become a favored method of raising revenue for state and local
governments,""' the tax-exempt status of municipal bonds means that
municipalities can borrow at lower rates than Indian tribes.172 The inability to
offer tax-exempt debt severely limits the ability of smaller tribes to borrow
competitively."'
Taxation is also not a viable method of raising revenue for Indian tribes.174
Though there is great debate surrounding the efficacy and fairness of the
American progressive-tax system, "theorists on both sides of the debate ...
agree that legislators and policymakers must avoid imposing tax costs on
individuals living at or below subsistence levels of income.""' Similarly,
tribal governments must avoid overtaxing their poorest citizens. Obviously,
this would include a large percentage of the citizenry of most tribes. Effective
taxation in Indian Country thus would require tribal governments to impose
heavy taxes upon their wealthiest members. Rightward-thinking economists
should immediately be put on alert. Higher tax rates have proven to be "a
major disincentive to production.""' If tribal governments are forced to tax
167. Clarkson, Tribal Bonds, supra note 146, at 1014.
168. Id.
169. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(c)(1) (2006). "Essential government function" has been interpreted
narrowly, limiting the circumstances under which tribes can issue tax-exempt bonds. See
Clarkson, Tribal Bonds, supra note 146, at 1045-52.
170. See Clarkson, Tribal Bonds, supra note 146, at 1014.
171. Id.
172. See JEFF MADURA, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 45 (8th ed. 2008) ("If all
other characteristics are similar, taxable securities will have to offer a higher before-tax yield
to investors than tax-exempt securities to be preferred.").
173. Clarkson, Tribal Bonds, supra note 146, at 1015 ("Most tribes [] are still unable to
access the capital markets competitively, if at all.").
174. Miller, supra note 6, at 833.
175. Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs ofthe Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND.L.REv.9 19,
921 (1997).




budding business owners too heavily, the stated purpose of the MTSTA is
unlikely to be achieved. Shifting toward private enterprise prematurely could
make it impossible for tribes to raise sufficient revenue.
B. Shifting to Private Enterprise Will Likely Be Ineffective
Efforts to develop urban ghettos have been made for decades."' To this
point, none of those efforts have achieved real success, and in many aspects,
the economic situation in those areas has worsened.' Shifting toward an
economic model that promotes private enterprise could relegate Indian tribes
to the same fate. The ability to operate state-owned enterprises is an advantage
that residents of urban ghettos cannot exploit.'"9 Wise implementation of the
tribally run model is Native America's most viable solution for sustained
economic growth.
C. The Recipe for Development: Imperfect Competition and Increasing
Returns
Economic theorist Erik Reinert explains that the crucial difference between
rich nations and poor nations lies in the very nature of their economies. 80
While the economies of poor nations are dominated by the production of raw
material commodities, the economies of the wealthy countries are dominated
by manufacturing.'"' Reinert asserts that the manufactured exports of the
richer countries "contain the 'good' [economic] effects - increasing returns
and imperfect competition - whereas traditional exports of poor countries
contain the opposite, the 'bad' effects" - diminishing returns and perfect
competition.182 It is necessary to explain these key concepts.
Perfect competition occurs when "the producer cannot influence the price
of what he produces. This situation is typically found in markets for
U.S. Experience, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 29, 37 (1993).
177. See Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development Corporations
in Inner City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 753, 759 (1996-
1997).
178. Id. at 753.
179. Theoretically, voters could elect legislators who would promote state-run industry. The
practical chances of such a move toward socialism in this country are, however, extremely
small.
180. ERIK S. REINERT, How RICH COUNTRIES GOT RICH AND WHY POOR COUNTRIES STAY
POOR 5 (2008).
181. See id. at 5-6.
182. Id. at 6.
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agricultural or mining products." 83 In the case of these products, product
differentiation - the process of distinguishing a product from others to make
it more attractive to a particular target marketl8 - is nearly impossible. 15
Effective product differentiation leads to monopolistic competition and
imperfect competition - "[t]he situation said to exist when, because of peculiar
conditions of the market or advantages held by certain buyers or sellers, prices
can be abnormally influenced by one or more traders."'8 When a firm creates
imperfect competition in a market, it has the ability to influence the price of
what it sells.
Consider a potato farmer on one hand and a producer of televisions on the
other. The farmer will likely be unable to convince consumers that his
potatoes are higher in quality than those produced by other farmers. As a
result, he will have little to no effect on the price of his potatoes; "he is facing
a 'perfect' market and literally reads in the newspaper what the market is
willing to pay."' This is near-perfect competition. Conversely, the television
manufacturer can employ clever marketing tactics to convince the consumer
that his product is worth more than other products on the market. If he
succeeds in his marketing tactics, he will be able to exert some control over the
price of his product. This is imperfect competition.
Another advantage enjoyed by rich nations is that they experience falling
costs as volumes of production increase. "When production is expanded in
manufacturing industry, cost developments go in the opposite direction - down
rather than up."'8 By contrast, poor countries usually experience diminishing
returns. Diminishing returns refers to the concept that, "as extra units of one
factor of production are employed, with all others held constant, the output
generated by each additional unit will eventually fall."' 89 Essentially, "as
production is expanded, after a certain point, more units of the same input -
capital and/or labour [sic] - will produce smaller and smaller amounts of new
output."' 9o
Again, consider our potato farmer and television manufacturer. Due to the
nature of his product, the potato farmer will reach a point, due to limitations
183. Id. at 5.
184. GRAHAM BANNOCK ET AL., DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 97 (4th ed. 2003).
185. REINERT, supra note 180, at 6.
186. HAROLD SLOAN & ARNOLD J. ZURCHER, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICs 215 (5th ed.
1970).
187. REINERT, supra note 180, at 5.
188. Id.
189. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 184, at 98.




on the amount of land available, etc., where adding workers and tractors is not
beneficial because each new person or tractor will produce less than the last
unit added. Unlike the farmer, the manufacturer has no immediate inputs that
are limited in quality and quantity. The manufacturer will "experience falling
costs . . . as volumes of production increase.""' This is because of the
phenomenon known as "economies of scale." Economies of scale are the cost
advantages obtained by businesses due to expansion.'92 They arise when the
cost per unit falls as output increases.' For example, as businesses grow and
require larger quantities of production inputs, order values increase and
businesses obtain more bargaining power and are able to obtain materials at
lower prices. Financial economies, another example, occur as larger firms find
it easier than small businesses to obtain lenders and to raise money at low
interest.'94 As the company becomes "big," the cost per unit falls as more
products are produced and sold.
These phenomena explain why urban ghettos have been unable to achieve
sustained economic development. It is difficult for companies to become
"big" when market forces are simply not conducive to such success. Consider
a small business owner in the inner-city who is seeking to start a small
convenience store. Why would individuals elect to shop in his store when they
can obtain the same goods from a large chain two miles down the road and
perhaps at a reduced price? They would not, and it is apparent that firms
seeking to break into the American economy must find ways to succeed at
product differentiation.' They must reduce directness of competition with
established firms by drawing fewer comparisons to those firms.196
Creating imperfect competition through product differentiation will require
innovation. Tribal businesses must figure out ways to produce products that
are superior - or at least products that consumers perceive to be superior - to
other products on the market. Tribes cannot shy away from this reality. Tribal
business must compete, and win, in the larger American markets. This is
where the state-run enterprise proves its worth. Tribally owned businesses
191. Id.
192. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 184, at 114.
193. Id.
194. See CHRISTINE AMMER& DEANS. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
375-76 (1977).
195. NEIL SEITZ & MITCH ELLISON, CAPITAL BUDGETING AND LONG TERM FINANCIAL
DECISIONS 37 (4th ed. 2005).
196. Id.
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enjoy several advantages that give them a much stronger chance than private
enterprises at achieving this end.
V Advantages of Tribally Owned Enterprises
A. Targeted Development
An important aspect of tribal-development strategy is the choice of
development activity.'97 Tribes undertaking tribally owned enterprise can and
must select "specific development projects . . . that take advantage of tribes'
market opportunities [and] allow tribes to specialize in using the natural and/or
human resources most available to them."" The ability to direct resources
toward the projects that are most likely to be successful is an advantage of the
tribally owned enterprise. In a system that promotes individual
entrepreneurship, resources are inevitably wasted on projects with very little
chance of success.199
Consider this example. A tribal member has an idea for a new radio that he
believes will produce better sound quality than any other device on the market.
If the tribe promotes private enterprise, there will likely be many other
members with ideas of their own. If each potential business owner must seek
financial capital from off-reservation lenders, then our deserving inventor will
likely be unable to secure any more financing than the other tribal members.
Our prospective entrepreneur's growth will undoubtedly be hindered. Even
if his project succeeds while the others fail, much will have been wasted. The
true winners may be the lending institutions who have recouped their high
interest loans.
Conversely, tribal governments seeking to establish profitable businesses
can examine the tribal member's proposal along with the others. If tribal
officials deem his idea to be the most likely of the group to be successful, then
the lion's share of resources can be thrown behind his project. As authors
Stephen Comell and Joseph P. Kalt note, "Many American Indian tribes face
a barrage of ideas, proposals, offers, and enticements - some from within the
tribe, many from outside it - aimed at establishing specific development or
investment projects on the reservation."200 Determining which proposals are
197. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 31, at 10.
198. Id.
199. See Rafael Efrat, The Tax Burden and the Propensity ofSmall-Business Entrepreneurs
to Filefor Bankruptcy, 4 HASTINGs Bus. L. J. 175, 177 (2008) ("[O]ver thirty-percent of small
businesses close within two years of establishment and over half close within four years.").
200. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 31, at 44.
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most viable is no easy task, and "[t]he success of tribal development activities
depends [] upon the strategic skills of decision-makers. . . . The heart of the
strategic problem is the appropriate matching of particular development
activities and projects to the governance capabilities, asset endowments, and
cultural attributes of the tribe."20 1
With the proper structure - one that promotes an environment in which
tribal decisions are made by wise individuals with adequate incentives -
efficient allocation of resources can be achieved. This is clearly an advantage
that tribally owned enterprises enjoy over the private enterprise.
B. Access to Capital
Innovation is usually expensive.202 An aspiring inventor must engage in
extensive research, trial models, and other steps before she can confidently
reproduce her innovation and put it on the market.203 Increasing returns may
be enjoyed in such circumstances. For example, "[t]he first copy of a software
product costs a lot to produce, but subsequent copies have a very low cost." 20
The small business owner, however, may have trouble obtaining the necessary
capital to produce that first copy.
Tribal governments have means of attaining financial capital that are simply
unavailable to the private business owner. Tribal governments that engage in
tribally owned enterprise receive revenue from those endeavors. 205 Those
same tribal governments can borrow at much lower rates than can the typical
small business owner.2 06 Additionally, "over thirty-percent of small businesses
close within two years of establishment and over half close within four
years." 207  Because of the risks associated with this high rate of failure,
purchasing bonds from a tribal government that owns much of the enterprise
on tribal land is generally a much safer investment than making similar loans
to individuals.
In addition to being subject to higher rates of interest on loans obtained
from off-reservation investors, individual entrepreneurs have access to only
201. Id. at 44-45.
202. See REINERT, supra note 180, at 5.
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. See Miller, supra note 6, at 760.
206. This is generally true where tribal revenue gained from tribal enterprise and taxation
renders the prospect of default less likely than that of a private enterprise whose ability to repay
debt depends upon the success of the enterprise. See generally MADURA, supra note 172, at 43-
44 (explaining the nature of credit default risk and its effect on the yields of debt securities).
207. Efrat, supra note 199, at 177.
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limited capital. The MTSTA, even if effective at achieving its end, cannot
counteract investors' reluctance to loan large sums of money to small business
owners. This is largely because federal regulations prohibit banks from
assuming excessive risk.208 It is also because making large investments to
support risky endeavors is unsound investment policy.209
C. The X-Factor: Tribal Loyalty
Loyalty among Indian tribal members may be the tribes' greatest
competitive advantage. American Indians elect to continue living on
reservations despite the prevalence of poor economic conditions. 2 10 Their
decision to remain has much to do with "the determination of Indians to
preserve their land, government, culture, religion, and traditions."21l
Furthermore, greed is frowned upon among the more communal tribes.212
Even government officials are strongly discouraged from achieving significant
gain from publicly owned businesses.2 13 It is likely that tribal laborers would
be willing to display similar selflessness for the good of the tribe.
Inexpensive labor is precisely the type of competitive advantage that could
enable tribes to flourish. Low labor costs significantly decrease the costs of
production and allow tribal businesses to yield higher returns.214 Additionally,
tribal loyalty is ideal for creating a beneficial corporate culture, which is
extremely valuable. In describing the importance of corporate culture, Seitz
and Ellison state that "[a] critical basis for cost advantage is a commitment to
efficient operations. The shared values and beliefs that make up the culture of
the organization must include the understanding that efficiency is important
and will be rewarded." 215
Tribal workers' willingness to sacrifice produces another momentous
advantage. Economic recessions occur when there is a substantial decrease in
aggregate demand - the total amount of goods and services that people want
to buy within an economy.216 In an ideal world, business would swiftly adjust
to shifts in aggregate demand by lowering prices, which would entice
208. See George H. Brown, Financial Institutions for Lawyers as Quasi-Public Enforcers,
7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 698-99 (1994).
209. See id. at 690-91.
210. PEVAR, supra note 14, at 4.
211. Id.
212. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 31, at 31.
213. Id. at 37.
214. See generally C.E. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 169-71 (1969).
215. SEITZ & ELLISON, supra note 195, at 38-39.




customers to again purchase full-employment levels of output2 " - the amount
of output produced in an economy when there is full employment in the labor
market.218 In the real world, the static nature of labor costs prevents speedy
price adjustments.219 Business owners have found that it is better to downsize
than lower wages, as wage decreases cause workers to retaliate by becoming
less productive.2 20 In extreme cases, tribal businesses can take advantage of
tribal loyalty by requesting that workers accept wage cuts. If the workers trust
those officials in charge of making such decisions, they may be more likely to
accept the cuts. Prices can be slashed, and tribal economies can seamlessly
return to full-employment output without eliminating workers. This is an
immense benefit that the tribally owned business can employ to facilitate
macroeconomic development.
Economic systems centered on tribal enterprise offer the most viable
opportunity for true economic growth. The MTSTA and similar tools
designed to entice movement toward private enterprise promote exploitation
and provide very little opportunity for real, sustainable growth and job
creation. Tribes should just say no.
VI. Political Moves that Could Help Facilitate Development
Existing tribal income simply cannot maintain the standard of
living to adequately maintain our culture. What should we do? If
a recommendation is made to the president, it should ask for
enough money for each reservation to honestly provide a standard
of living that will support tribal sovereignty and self-rule. Then,
we can proudly say, this is our culture and we are taking care of
ourselves.
-- Benjamin Reifel, former commissioner of Indian affairs22'
It is imperative that Indian tribes exhaust all available political avenues to
help ensure that tribal governments have sufficient monies to carry out their
businesses. One source of capital that should be tapped is the federal
government. Regrettably, the prospects of obtaining more federal funds
217. See id. at 129.
218. See id at 121.
219. Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and the
Mistranslation of the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 3, 48 (1999).
220. See MERKLEIN, supra note 216, at 69-70.
221. Joe De La Cruz et al., What Indians Should Want: Advice to the President, in INDIAN
SELF-RULE 311 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986).
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appear slim. 222 Although "[c]urrently, there are 184 grant and loan programs
to support economic development in Indian Country," 223 these programs have
enjoyed limited success. 2 24 This trend contradicts statements made by the
Supreme Court. According to the Court,
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States.... Because of the
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are
often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power.225
The argument for greater federal funding for Indian tribes is also supported by
the trust relationship that exists between the federal government and the tribes.
The Supreme Court has noted "the undisputed existence of a general trust
relationship between the United States and the Indian people."226 Incident to
this relationship, "[b]etween 1787 and 1871, the United States entered into
nearly four hundred treaties with Indian tribes." 2 7 In those treaties, the United
States obtained desired land from Indian tribes, "and in return, the United
States set aside [] reservation lands for those tribes and guaranteed that the
federal government would respect 'the sovereignty of the tribes, [] would
'protect' the tribes, [and would] provide food, clothing, and services to the
tribes."' 228
Admittedly, no treaty provides for specific federal funding to be issued for
the benefit of Indian tribes; however, this country's moral obligation cannot
be overlooked. If our elected officials have any interest in promoting justice
and fair dealing, they must make a commitment to facilitate tribal development
efforts. Considering the long history of mistreatment toward Indians, the
222. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 31, at 11 ("With declines in federal funding over the last
decade and poor prospects for significant increases in the near future, attention to the
institutions-of-governance factor can be the best way to overcome the access-to-capital
obstacle.").
223. Wagner, supra note 47, at 528.
224. See id. at 529.
225. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (emphasis removed).
226. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).





tribes should perhaps be wary of expecting any sudden acts of true
benevolence.
A more achievable political aim that could have deeply positive effects on
tribal governments' access to financial capital is the issuance of tax-exempt
bonds, a highly complex and constantly evolving paradigm. Recall "that a tax-
exempt bond is 'a debt security in which the interest portion of the debt service
paid is not included in gross income.' The tax-exempt status of municipal debt
allows state and local governments to issue bonds at lower interest rates."229
Only about fifteen percent of tribes have obtained tax-exempt financing from
lenders. 23 0 Furthermore, "Indian tribes can only issue tax-exempt [bonds] if
'substantially all' of the borrowed proceeds 'are to be used in the exercise of
any essential governmental function."'
231
After favorable interpretations of the 1982 Tribal Tax Status Act adopting
broad readings of the essential-government-function requirement,2 32 the IRS
began to aggressively enforce the requirement in the years following a 1987
Amendment.233 It is widely believed "that the percentage of tribal bonds
audited is substantially greater than the percentage of non-tribal bonds." 234 As
a result of this inequity, "tribal governments [] issued an average of [only] five
tax-exempt bonds" per year between 2002 and 2004.235 During the same
period, non-tribal "governments issued an average of 14,038 tax-exempt
bonds" per year.236
The inability to issue tax-exempt debt outside the narrow confines imposed
by the IRS is a substantial blow to tribal economies. A relevant and essential
benefit enjoyed by tribal governments over private enterprise is the ability to
obtain large amounts of financial capital at reasonable interest rates.237
Convincing the federal government to expand tribal tax-exempt bonding
authority could significantly aid efforts to actualize tribal economic
development. It would be wise for American Indians, and those sympathetic
229. Clarkson, Tribal Bonds, supra note 146, at 1014.
230. Id. at 1015.
231. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(e) (2006).
232. Clarkson, Tribal Bonds, supra note 146, at 1042.
233. Id. at 1045-46.
234. Id. at 1046.
235. Id. at 1047.
236. Id.
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debt depends upon the success of the enterprise. See generally MADURA, supra note 172, at 43-
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to their interests, to pressure our legislature to amend legislation and expand
tribal authority.
VII. Conclusion
There is no doubt that tribal economic development is hampered by a lack
of access to financial capital that could be used to spark and sustain businesses
in Indian Country. Article 9 has proven effective in promoting loan
arrangements between creditors and entrepreneurs for decades. The Model
Tribal Secured Transactions Act, nearly identical to Article 9 in most relevant
aspects, simply does not account for the complications that arise as a result of
financial arrangements between reservation debtors and off-reservation
creditors. Specifically, it does not provide adequate safeguards against
predatory lending, and the possibility that the profits of American banks will
prove detrimental to Indian debtors is too great to ignore. The tribally run
business model currently prevalent throughout Indian Country may indeed be
the answer to the development conundrum facing most tribes. The ability of
tribes to raise revenue by engaging in tribal enterprise and issuing bonds is
precisely what is needed to amass the vast startup capital necessary for
innovation and product differentiation in the American market. American
Indians have never lacked ingenuity. Only through that ingenuity will the
Native American reverse centuries of misfortune and rise as a major force in
the world economy.
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